( r ) It seems clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not itself apply to actions in state courts. It is doubtless true that many of the animating principles underlying the r932 statute are implicated whenever a strike is sought to be subjected to the control of equity, in state or federal court.3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has dramatically sustained the attribution of substantive import to Norris-LaGuardia, despite the act's juris dictional language, as a legislative response to judicial interpreta tion of earlier statutory regulation.4 Finally, it is at least part of the story to note that the statute was cast as it was because of doubts, soon thereafter dispelled, whether Congress had power to make substantive law to govern labor disputes.5 The fact remains that the decision was made to write a statute addressed to the federal courts, that the problem there may have been thought at *Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., New York University, 1952; A.M., Columbia, 1953 , LL.B., 1958 least to some degree more acute, 6 and that the issue of legislative policy would have been significantly altered had Congress been asked to exercise its power to regulate commerce.7
(2) Section 301, it is clear, does apply to state courts.8 I be lieve, however, that the federal law of section 301 should not be held to "incorporate" the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibitions on injunctions against strikes in breach of contract. Of course Norris-LaGuardia is "federal law," and "federal law" controls.
But to settle the question so simply comes close to adjudication by pun. As Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl vania put the matter: 9
Appellant contends that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an expression of federal labor policy and as such must be incorporated within and made an integral part of the national labor policy expressed in Section 301. Even so, it does not follow that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, if woven into the fabric of Section 301, would express a na tional labor policy to prohibit the granting of injunctive relief by state courts . . ..
Certainly the setting of neither the 1932 nor the 194 7 legislative expression of national labor policy warrants "incorporation" of Norris-LaGuardia.10 As for judicial pronouncements, the Su preme Court's Sinclair Refining decision 11 says no more than 6 Federal question jurisdiction prior to I93 2 involved use of the Sherman Act, with results that Congress sought to reverse with Norris-LaGuardia. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 3II U.S. 9I (I940); Witte, supra note 5, at 649 n.2o. Diversity jurisdiction in the pre-Erie period en abled federal judges to fashion more restrictive rules than were being developed in the courts of some states. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 483 (I92I) . For an illustration of at tempts to create diversity jurisdiction in labor disputes, see Fortney v. Carter, 203 Fed. 454 (4th Cir. I9I3 ) (bondholders of struck corporation, alleging threat to their security interests, permitted to sue strikers).
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to strikes in breach of contract no less than to organizational or bargaining strikes, and that section 301 cannot be taken to repeal that act, or to authorize inroads upon its protection. There was no assumption of judicial responsibility to weigh the need to protect concerted activities against the danger to the security of contractual arrangements. Indeed the Court eschewed any such roleY In such a context it would be intolerable to find in the uniformity principle of Lucas Flour r:; a sufficient ground for compelling state conformity to the strictures of Norris-LaGuardia. The channeling of litigation into state courts because of the availability of injunctive relief there may be unfortunate/4 but something more is needed to justify federal invalidation of state law. Since a uniform rule permitting specific enforcement of no-strike clauses was rejected, not as a result of the Court's own fashioning of an appropriate rule of federal labor law, but simply in obedience to the legislative man date that federal judges not enjoin strikes/5 that rejection (proper
12
[W]e do not see how cases implementing the purpose of § 301 can be said to have freed this Court from its duty to give effect to the plainly expressed con gressional purpose with regard to the continued application of the anti-injunc tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The argument to the contrary seems to rest upon the notion that injunctions against peaceful strikes are necessary to make the arbitration process effective. But whatever might be said about the merits of this argument, Congress has itself rejected it. In doing so, it set the limit to which it was willing to go in permitting courts to effectu ate the congressional policy favoring arbitration and it is not this Court's business to review the wisdom of that decision.
ld. at 213. See also id. at 2IO: "When the repeal of a highly significant law is urged upon [Congress] ... and that repeal is rejected after careful consideration and discussion, the normal expectation is that courts will be faithful to their trust and abide by that decision."
These excerpts suggest the accuracy of reading Sinclair as it was read in Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1096, noo (1965): "It did not make the positive determination that a new general anti-injunction policy existed; it made the nega tive determination that section 301 did not alter the old, limited anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia." 15 Consistent with its view that it was not making law, the Court in Sinclair did not even consider the effect of its decision on state power. See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, 370 U.S. at 226.
though it was 16) should not now be parlayed with a revived interest in practical accommodations and judicial creativity to compel the states to obey a mandate never addressed to them.
(3) The matter is not closed, however, by a judgment that the federal law of section 301 does not incorporate Norris-LaGuardia. The anti-injunction statute aside, it seems clear that the conditions governing the availability of injunctive relief should not be re garded as "procedural" for the purpose of deciding the choice of governing law. The question is nothing less "substantive" than the balance to be struck between the need to vindicate contract rights through specific performance and the dangers to protected concerted activities of permitting equity to exercise its fearsome powers too close by. Had Congress never enacted the 1932 statute, we would long since have seen the development of a corpus of federal rulings dealing with injunctions in labor disputes. Some would have been the product of judicial decisions/7 others em bodied in the Federal Rules/8 other enacted by the legislature.19 These principles would govern federal court actions, and the Supreme Court would have authority to decide whether effectu ation of the purposes of the extensive federal regulatory scheme in the labor-management field called for similar restrictions on state power to enforce no-strike clauses.20 [W]hen federally-created rights are enforced in the state courts .. . the cardinal consideration is federal paramountcy .... Moreover, federal para mountcy extends as much to procedural as to substantive matters; if the federal purpose is clear, and if it is valid, there is no room for local procedural auton omy ... and this is true whether the federal purpose is evidenced by an express Congressional enactment of a "procedural" character or is reasonably inferable from the substantive federal right in issue.
Even a firm adherent of a "general rule ... that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them," Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 An affirmative answer would often be called for. The federal law whose application Lincoln Mills prescribes is one "which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 2 1 One can, I believe, sum up the themes of federal concern with reasonable accuracy in a few words, although documentation would require a sensitive recollection of two generations of history. The core of the danger is improvident inhibition of pro tected strikes -in practice not often undone by subsequent lift ing of the restraint-through fallible factfinding or overbroad decrees.22 The development of the preemption doctrine has made clear the central concern, in the Court's perception of national labor policy, that protected concerted activities have "breathing space to survive." 23 There is a strong federal interest in assuring that the remedial scheme by which contract rights are vindicated does not encroach unduly on protected activities.24 Breach-of contract suits are of course not removed from judicial cognizance, whether state or federal,25 but a state may now vindicate stateCoLuM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954) , would presumably acknowledge a greater concern with the impact of state "procedure" when it is the federal rights of defendants (rather than plaintiffs) that are at stake. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 397 (1953) (jurisdiction of state court to hear federal defense). As for the "defense " of removal, see note 36 infra. created rights only to the extent that they conform to the evolving federal law of labor contracts.26 Indeed, description of the con tract rights in question as "state-created/' while doubtless an accurate reflection of the traditions that move a state court to grant or deny a right of action, can probably claim no better legal credentials than those accorded harmless error.27 Federal law should set the outer limits of the availability of injunctive relief in actions governed by section 301.
(4) The question therefore remains: What is the content of the relevant federal law? Some immediately visible problem areas can be readily perceived. The greater difficulty is to strike a proper balance between the demands of federal labor policy and of state procedural autonomy. The case that seems to me easiest to resolve in favor of federal restraint is the use of ex parte restraining orders. Here lies the greatest danger to federally pro tected rights.28 At the same time, the interference with state pro cedure is relatively slight. I would argue that the spirit of Rule 6 5 (b) 29 and NLRA section IO ( l) 30 must be observed, and that restraining orders should not be issuable without notice ex cept on a recitation of immediate need and (more important) should be limited to a short time certain, not renewable ex parte.
More difficulty surrounds the procedure governing preliminary injunctions. One can readily state the requisites of full protec tion: an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on demand;
26 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962) . A broader reading of the Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, and Evening News cases, as rendering all of the underlying aims of the preemption doctrine wholly inapplicable to § 301 actions, is not warranted by the decisions.
27 State substantive rules of contract law must bow when they would hold actionable what federal law deems lawful, see id. at 105 n.r4, and when they would treat as permitted what under federal law is sufficient to constitute a breach. Cf. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. , 363 U.S. 564 (1960) . The Court has not, to my knowledge, given any support to the view that state substantive law is permitted to operate as such within a "zone of reasonableness " set by federal law. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) ("any state law applied ... will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independ ent source of private rights"); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., supra note 26, at 102; American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 83 7, 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (Hastie, J ., dissenting), cert.
denied, 380 U. S. 935 (1965) .
28 For the still-classic statement of the problem of "temporary " equitable relief, The question of the availability of injunction bonds presents, in my view, a relatively weaker federal need. The aim of bond requirements is twofold: to discourage improper resort to equity through a financial deterrent, and to provide some recompense for respondents wrongly denied self-help at the time they chose to resort to it. When the procedures by which a state litigates equity suits are otherwise adequate to safeguard federally protected rights, I would not think that this requirement is so central to the protection of such rights that a state must provide it.
The thesis of this Comment is the presence of "federal law" apart from the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That law asks whether a particular aspect of a state's equity jurisprudence unduly threat ens the policy against erosion of federally protected concerted 31 I have in mind here the practice of review by a court en bane of orders issued by a single judge.
32 Cf. 28 U.S. C. § r292 (a) (r) (rg64) (district court issuance or denial of pre liminary injunction appealable to court of appeals) ; Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 37r U.S. 542 (r963) (state court issuance of preliminary injunction appealable to Supreme Court when federal defense litigated).
33 It should be borne in mind that the prescription would probably be condi tional only. A state would be required to meet federal standards or forego the ex ercise of equity jurisdiction. It would, of course, be a far greater interference to tell a state that it was required to grant specific enforcement of no-strike clauses, but subject to federal restraints on the procedure for doing so. I would not think that the obligation of state courts to enforce federal law, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (r947), embraces any such requirement, although the problem might have been somewhat more difficult had Sinclair not been decided as it was.
34 The assumption has two aspects: (a) the application of the rule of the Curry case, see note 32 supra, to § 30I actions; (b) characterization of the lower state court as the highest "in which a decision could be had " (28 U.S. C. § r257 (rg64)), despite the later availability, on issuance of a permanent injunction, of furth er state court review.
activities.35 Illustrations are needed to give flesh to the under lying question, and to suggest the process of forming an answer, but it would be premature for me to press the analysis further here.36 The concept of federal law applicable only in state courts seems a strange one. But the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an uncom mon piece of legislation. Its applicability to federal court actions prevented the development of more particularized restric tions on state equity jurisdiction, but its inapplicability to state court actions does not render inapplicable all federal concern. Once the demands of the federal common law are perceived, and the governing considerations expressed, the resolution of specific problems remains the task of that fallible, indispensable servant, "litigating elucidation." 36 Putting aside any supposed "incorporation" of Norris-LaGuardia, it seems clear that a court fashioning federal common law should not adopt a rule absolutely prohibiting specific relief against a strike in breach of contract. See, e.g., the discussion in Wellington & Albert, supra note 16, at 1552-59.
If state courts are to be permitted the exercise of equity jurisdiction denied to federal judges by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the removal jurisdiction should not be read to permit an end-run around such jurisdiction. See the discussion in Comment, II3 U. PA. L. REv. 1096 REv. , 1097 REv. -98 (1965 .
